Abstract. In this paper, we consider stochastic linear-quadratic discrete-time Nash games in which two players have access only to noisecorrupted output measurements. We assume that each player is constrained to use a linear Kalman filter-like state estimator to implement his optimal strategies. Two information structures available to the players in their state estimators are investigated. The first has access to onestep delayed output and a one-step delayed control input of the player. The second has access to the current output and a one-step delayed control input of the player. In both cases, statistics of the process and statistics of the measurements of each player are known to both players. A simple example of a two-zone energy trading system is considered to illustrate the developed Nash strategies. In this example, the Nash strategies are calculated for the two cases of unlimited and limited transmission capacity constraints.
Introduction
Stochastic Nash games in which the players have access only to noisecorrupted output measurements have been of interest since the late 1960s. Rhodes and Luenberger (Refs. 1, 2) studied linear-quadratic Gaussian (LQG) continuous-time zero-sum stochastic games with output measurements corrupted by additive independent white Gaussian noise. They considered a saddle-point solution to this problem under the constraint that each player is limited to a linear state estimator for generating his optimal 1 Vice President of Engineering and Development, Genscape, Louisville, Kentucky.
controls. Saksena and Cruz (Ref. 3) extended these results to nonzero-sum Nash games and derived a method for obtaining a near-equilibrium limiting solution for the Nash strategies under a multimodel situation. They also studied stochastic control of singularly perturbed linear systems with multiple decision-makers possessing different observations under a multimodel situation. In all of the above-mentioned research works (Ref. [1] [2] [3] , the authors assumed that the separation principle holds.
In this paper, we investigate discrete-time nonzero-sum LQG Nash games with constrained state estimators and two different information structures. In the first information structure, we assume that, at each stage, each player has access to his output measurements and his own control input at the previous stage. In the second information structure, we assume that, at each stage, each player has access to his output measurements at the current stage and his own control input at the previous stage. We show that, for these two information structures, the separation principle does not hold; therefore, the controller and estimator are interrelated and cannot be determined separately. In each case, we derive an algorithm for calculating the optimum estimators and controllers for the closed-loop Nash solution.
The results are applied to a simple energy trading system with two generating firms as players.
Problem Formulation
Consider a two-player discrete linear game described by the following difference equation:
where x k is the state vector and u 1 k , u 2 k are the control vectors of players 1, 2 respectively. We will assume that players 1 and 2 have noisy measurements of the form
The dimensions of x k , u (2) are assumed to be independent, white, zero-mean, and Gaussian with covariances
For simplicity, it is also assumed that both players know that the initial state x 0 is a Gaussian random vector (uncorrelated with w k , û 
Consider the following discrete-time additive quadratic cost functions for players 1 and 2:
where the matrices Q
j are all symmetric and positive semidefinite for j∈ [0, N] . These represent costs-to-go functions from an arbitrary initial state x k at stage k. We assume that the admissible controls are linear in the state estimates and that each player is restricted to use an ndimensional linear estimator to generate his state estimate at each time step. We consider the following two information structures: In both cases, there are no observations at kG0. As mentioned earlier, both players know all the expected values and covariances of all the noises and the initial state.
Closed-Loop Nash for Information Structure Type A
For the information structure X 
and for player 2 in the form
The objective function of player 1 is the conditional expectation E{J
k }, and the objective function of player 2 is the conditional expectation E{J 
The pair of inequalities in (7) defines the closed-loop Nash equilibrium pair {u
The admissible controls in (7) are assumed to be linear in the state estimates for all k∈[0, NA1], Bn bounded closed-loop gain matrices to be determined so that (6) and (7) are satisfied.
We provide algorithms for computing the Nash-optimal feedback gains L i k , iG1, 2, the matrices 
where
and 
In the above expression, M k is a symmetric nonnegative-definite matrix defined as follows:
and satisfying the following recursive equation:
with boundary conditions
Assume that the solution matrices are invertible for all k∈ [1, NA1] , and that each player knows the objective function and the system dynamics of the other player. In other words, the matrices Q
k , W k are known to both players. We have the following theorem. Theorem 3.1. Given the linear system described by (1)- (4), the quadratic cost functions given by (5), the estimates of x kC1 at time kC1 as given by (6), and the definition of a Nash equilibrium solution as given by (7) 
in the state estimators equations (6) are given by
Furthermore, the optimal conditional expectations of the cost-to-go functions at time k are given by
with terminal condition
Remark 3.1. We note that the closed-loop Nash control laws
do not satisfy the separation principle. As it can be seen from equation (10), the calculations of the optimal control gains (L 1 k , L 2 k ) depend on the components of the matrix M k , which is related to the estimation error covariance matrix. Also, the estimator equations (21)- (22) depend on the controller gains. Thus, the controller and estimator cannot be separated. However, we should note that, if the measurements y 
A similar argument applies for the estimator-controller of player 2. By substituting (26) in the system difference equation (1), we have
By subtracting (6a) from (28), using (20c) [note that, using (20c), the estimation error dynamics will not be a function of optimal control u 1 k ], and after some algebraic manipulations, we have
Similarly by subtracting (6b) from (28), using (21c) [note that, using (21c), the estimation error dynamics will not be a function of optimal control u 2 k ], and after some algebraic manipulations, we have x
Now, we form the composite vectors m k , û k defined by
From (28)- (30) and (16)-(19), we have
From the above expression, we can derive equation (14a) 
where ∆ k and Λ k are known matrices. By choice of the initial condition (14b),
Moreover, since M k is a symmetric matrix, we have
From the definition (12) of M k and equation (35) 
which implies 
By standard estimation theory, we require that
or
Let us calculate
At kG0, 
From (39)-(42), we have
Using (20)- (22), (26), (38), the difference equation (6a) for x 1 k may be written as
with initial condition given by (43a 
Using stochastic dynamic programming and using mathematical induction, the closed-loop Nash control gains for players 1 and 2 are calculated as follows:
i, jG1, 2, i≠j, and kG0, . . . , NA1.
We will present the proof for player1. A similar procedure can be followed for player 2. We have that
Now, setting
Similarly, for player 2, setting
Denote
By substitution of (52)- (53) into (48) and using (24)- (25), we have
which completes the proof for player 1. A symmetrical argument proves the results for player 2. ᮀ Although the optimum cost-to-go at time k separates into three groups of terms, the first group is not just the conditional expectation of a term that is analogous to the deterministic case, because the Riccati equation for 
Closed-Loop Nash for Information Structure Type B
We now consider the second type of information structure,
In this case, instead of (6), we use the following form of the state estimators:
where the matrices A k ,B k are the same as given in equation (1), the matrices are the same as given in equation (2) . The closed-loop Nash strategies for this information structure lead to the same algorithms for the controller and estimation matrices as the ones obtained earlier. However, note that the actual optimal estimator equations resulting from (55) are not the same as the optimal estimator equations resulting from (6).
Numerical Computation
A suggested iteration for the calculation of matrices K (19) is given as follows:
. . , 0, backward in time using equations (9) and (10).
Step 3. Start Iteration 1. Calculate the matrix Ā k , kG0, . . . , NA1, forward in time using equation (16).
Step
. . , NA1, forward in time using equations (14) and (11), respectively.
Step 5. Solve for
. . , 0, backward in time using equations (9) and (10). This is the end of Iteration 1.
Step 6. Start Iteration 2 by repeating Steps 3 to 5.
Step 7. Compare the matrices K 
Simple Application
In this section, we present a simple example of a two-zone energy trading system, shown in Fig. 1 , as an application of the proposed Nash solution. In this example, two electric energy-generating firms, labeled G1 and G2, are trying to sell energy in a day-ahead (24 hour ahead) energy market. They try to minimize their electricity production costs in the Nash sense. The firms should satisfy the system demand D k at each trading hour k. The market rules require both firms to bid for all 24 trading hours at once. Therefore, the optimization horizon for both firms is 24 hours (NG24). Itis assumed that, at each hour k, both firms have quadratic cost-to-go functions of the form represent the bid quantities for firms G1 and G2 respectively at hour k. The term 0.1x 2 N represents the no-load cost for each firm. The system dynamics is described by the energy balance equation
kG1, 2, . . . , 24.
We will assume that each firm has a noisy measurement of the system demand at each trading hour k. That is,
k are independent, white, zero-mean, and Gaussian noises with covariances
.8, respectively. Furthermore, the initial demand x 0 at kG0 is assumed to be a Gaussian random process with mean x 0 G0.5 and covariance Γ 0 G0.085. Finally, assuming that the bid prices (marginal costs) p 
2 k , the total profits for each firm over the 24 hour time horizon can be calculated as
The system parameters that are needed to calculate the Nash bid quantities and prices for each firm for k∈ [0, NA1] are The system demand, player 1 estimate of the system demand, player 2 estimate of the system demand, and the Nash strategies for both firms in Case 1 (no transmission constraint) are shown in Fig. 2 . The Nash strategies include bid quantities (in MW) and bid prices (in $ per MW) for both firms. Similar results are shown in Fig. 3 for Case 2 (transmission line capacity limit of 80 MW). The simulation results of Case 2 show that, for the peak demand hours (8 to 20), firm G1 cannot sell more that 80 MW, due to the transmission line capacity limit. This will cause an increase in the average energy price in zone 2 during the peak demand hours. The average energy price goes up from $24.00 per MW in Case 1 (no transmission constraint) to $36.00 per MW in Case 2 (with transmission constraints) during peak demand hours. On the other hand, the average energy price in zone 1 will drop to $16.00 per MW. Therefore, the average congestion price of transmission line T 12 can be calculated as the difference between the zone 1 and zone 2 average energy prices ($36.00A$16.00G$20.00 per MW).
The expected profits for the two firms in Case 1 are π G1 G$21,684.00, π G2 G$13,761.00.
The ratios of total cost to no-load cost for both firms in Case 1 are r G1 G21.7, r G2 G14.5.
The expected profits for the two firms in Case 2 are π G1 G$15,222.00, π G2 G$25,899.00.
The ratios of total cost to no-load cost for both firms in Case 2 are: r G1 G16.9, r G2 G32.0.
Conclusions
In this paper, a solution for the stochastic LQG nonzero-sum Nash games with constrained state information is presented. It is assumed that each player is limited to a linear Kalman filter-like estimator to generate his optimal controls. The optimal control laws (u 1* k , u 2* k ) that solve the above stochastic discrete-time Nash game do not satisfy the separation principle. As it can be seen from equation (10), the calculation of the optimal control gains (L 1 k , L 2 k ) depends on the components of matrix M k , which is related to the estimation error covariance matrix. Therefore, the controller and estimator cannot be separated. However, we should note that, if the measurements y 1 k Gy 2 k in (2), then the matrices S 1 k , S 2 k in (11) will converge to the identity matrix and the controller gains will not depend on the state estimation errors. However, the estimator equations will still depend on the controller gains.
A simple example of a two-zone energy trading system is considered to illustrate the developed Nash strategies. In this example, the Nash strategies are calculated for the two cases of unlimited and limited transmission capacity constraints.
The simulation results show that transmission capacity constraint (Case 2) could cause a decrease in expected profits of player 1. On the other hand, the expected profits of player 2 would increase during peak demand hours upon the existence of transmission congestion. The linear strategy pair (u 1* k , u 2* k ) [given by (26)] will be the unique Nash strategy for the above stochastic discrete-time linear-quadratic game if the solutions
